The IASB and FASB have today published the definitive (for the moment) chapters of their joint conceptual framework for financial reporting. The project, which is supposed to lead to 'internally consistent' standards is already so riddled with contradictions that it has little credibility. However, the long extended search for a framework allows the standard setters to defer awkward questions almost indefinitely.
The latest twist  is the assertion that the purpose of financial statements is to
'To provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions about providing resources to the entity.'
The irony of this is that most equity investors never provide any financial resources to an entity. They buy and sell second-hand shares. When new resources are supplied to an entity, more information, by way of prospectuses and so on, is created that supplements financial statements.
 Well I assume the final document includes this phrase. At the time of writing I'm relying on a previous document as I don't have access to the actual document; it is not freely available - one has to pay for a subscription to get it.
David Tweedie has apparently confirmed that the IASB is considering including a 'regulators'' page in financial statements so that people concerned with financial institutions can be given the information they need to ensure market stability. It's quite likely that this will include something that looks very like a historical cost balance sheet, and so, rather being something new, this might signal a return to something old.
This could be a fascinating accounting experiment and would give standard setters an opportunity to find out what information is actually demanded, has impact and has value relevance. I foresee the growth of a minor industry in researching the relative importance of regulatory and 'decision useful' information.
Our growth in understanding what went on at Lehman's proceeds apace. Despite the criticism of financial transactions that occurred in London, it seems the accounting that is at issue occurred in the USA. It's said that because the Repo transactions involved exchanging assets worth more than $105 for every $100 of cash received SFAS 140 permitted them to be treated as sales because Lehman's wouldn't have had enough cash to buy them back again.